[dependabot]

Bumps the go_modules group with 1 update in the /adapters/echo directory: github.com/labstack/echo/v4.
Bumps the go_modules group with 1 update in the /examples/echo-app directory: github.com/labstack/echo/v4.

Updates github.com/labstack/echo/v4 from 4.16.1 to 4.16.3

Release notes

Sourced from github.com/labstack/echo/v4's releases.

v4.16.3

Security and migration

Applications behind proxies must configure Echo#IPExtractor to trust their own proxies before upgrading. Without an extractor, clients behind one proxy share its address for rate limiting, IP-based access controls, logging, and proxy forwarding. The safe default now ignores client-supplied IP headers.

This release fixes the remaining v4 exposure for:

• CVE-2026-118651: Proxy always derives upstream X-Real-IP from Context.RealIP(), including after hop-by-hop header stripping and on WebSocket upgrades. One derived identity is preserved across retries.
• CVE-2026-118653: Context.RealIP() uses the connection peer when IPExtractor is unset, so rotating spoofed forwarded-IP headers cannot create fresh default rate-limit buckets.

Use echo.ExtractIPDirect() without a proxy. Behind a proxy, use ExtractIPFromXFFHeader or ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader with trust restricted to your proxies. Configure the outermost proxy to replace client-supplied identity headers. Explicit extractors and custom rate-limit identifiers retain their behavior.

Migration example with explicit proxy trust ranges

Other changes

• Resolve bare IPv4 and IPv6 connection addresses without a port.
• Document v4 support dates (#3194).

No dependency or minimum Go-version changes; Go 1.26 or later remains required.

The security fix (#3197) passed independent agent and Claude reviews, full race tests on Go 1.26 and 1.27, and GitHub Linux/macOS/Windows checks.

Full Changelog: labstack/echo@v4.16.2...v4.16.3

v4.16.2

Fixes

• Require a space after the case-insensitive Basic authentication scheme. Malformed schemes such as BasicX no longer invoke the credential validator. Valid credentials are still required. This adapts the v5 correction to v4's single-header API. #3188, backport of #3138, with credit to @​Shubham-Padkonde.
• Reject empty cookie tokens and empty client tokens in CSRF validation. This is defense in depth; it does not introduce a new security advisory. #3189, backport of #3135, with credit to @​hoangtaiki.
• Reject CSRFConfig.TokenLookup configurations that produce no recognized token extractors. Middleware creation now returns an error instead of silently skipping token validation. #3149, thanks to @​orinnz; backport of the existing v5 validation in #3067.

Upgrade

go get github.com/labstack/echo/v4@v4.16.2

Go 1.26 remains the module minimum. Build deployments with a supported, patched Go toolchain. No dependencies or public APIs changed in this release. Applications with invalid CSRF token lookup configuration will now fail middleware creation at startup.

The security fixes, bounded BodyDump and Decompress defaults, and dependency updates released in v4.16.1 are included unchanged. Their first patched version remains v4.16.1.

Validation: the fixes passed regression tests and upstream race-test, lint and benchmark checks on Linux, macOS and Windows with Go 1.26 and 1.27. The new regressions were also verified to fail without the fixes; local race tests and vet passed.

Full changelog: labstack/echo@v4.16.1...v4.16.2

Changelog

Sourced from github.com/labstack/echo/v4's changelog.

v4.16.3 - 2026-10-29

Security

• Client IP defaults: when Echo#IPExtractor is unset, Context.RealIP() now uses the connection peer and ignores X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP. This prevents clients from selecting their own default rate-limit bucket. Fixes CVE-2026-118653.
• Proxy identity: Proxy middleware always replaces upstream X-Real-IP with the derived client identity, including after Connection-nominated header removal and on WebSocket upgrades. The identity is derived once and preserved across retries. Fixes CVE-2026-118651.

Migration required for applications behind proxies

Configure Echo#IPExtractor to trust only your deployment's proxies before upgrading. Otherwise, clients behind one proxy share its address for rate limiting, access controls, logging, and proxy forwarding. See the README migration example for explicit XFF trust ranges; use the same trust options with ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader for proxies that set X-Real-IP. Configure the outermost proxy to replace client-supplied identity headers. Explicit extractors and custom rate-limit identifiers retain their behavior.

Other changes

• The direct-peer fallback now accepts bare IPv4 and IPv6 addresses without a port.
• Document v4 bug-fix and security-fix support dates (#3194).

Implementation: #3197. No dependency or minimum Go-version changes; Go 1.26 or later remains required.

v4.16.0 - 2026-09-27

Security

This release fixes several security issues. Upgrading is recommended. Some fixes change behavior; read "Behavior changes to check before upgrading" below.

• Request scheme: Context.Scheme() now uses the X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Protocol, X-Forwarded-Ssl and X-Url-Scheme headers only when the request comes directly from a loopback, link-local or private network address or a unix socket. Before this, any client could send X-Forwarded-Proto: https over plain HTTP and skip HTTPSRedirect. When X-Forwarded-Proto is present, only it is used (its last value), and the scheme is returned in lowercase. the new Echo#SchemeExtractor field selects the strategy: ExtractSchemeFromHeaders(...TrustOption) (default), ExtractSchemeDirect() or LegacySchemeExtractor(). The Secure middleware now sets HSTS based on Context.Scheme(). The Proxy middleware always sets X-Forwarded-Proto from Context.Scheme() and removes X-Forwarded-Ssl, X-Forwarded-Protocol and X-Url-Scheme before forwarding. GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p
• JSONP: Context.JSONP and Context.JSONPBlob accept only a callback that is empty, a JavaScript identifier or a dot-separated path of identifiers (ASCII letters, digits, _ and $). Any other callback returns a 400 Bad Request error that wraps the new ErrInvalidJSONPCallback, and nothing is written. JSONP responses now carry X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff. JSONP lets any website read the response with the user's cookies, so do not use it for data that needs authentication. GHSA-h9g5-28mm-hx3g
• MethodOverride: a POST can no longer be overridden to GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE or CONNECT. Before this, with the MethodFromForm or MethodFromQuery getter and MethodOverride registered with Use before the CSRF middleware, _method=GET skipped the CSRF check. Register MethodOverride with Echo#Pre. GHSA-r7w9-592q-9vg4
• Redirects: the trailing slash middlewares and the static directory redirect percent-encode control characters in the redirect path. Before this, /%09/evil.example/ redirected browsers to evil.example. GHSA-v753-g4cw-jm48
• Static files: with the default settings, the Static middleware resolves files from the same form of the path that the router matched, so /admin%2Fsecret.txt or /%61dmin/secret.txt can no longer reach a file under a guarded /admin/* route. GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4 The Static middleware and StaticDirectoryHandler (used by Echo.Static, Echo.StaticFS, Group.Static and Group.StaticFS) no longer serve paths with a ., .. or empty segment, such as /assets/../admin/secret.txt, also after path unescaping. GHSA-3pmx-cf9f-34xr
• Dependencies: update golang.org/x/text to v0.40.0 (GO-2026-5970).

Client IP address (no code change in v4)

Without Echo#IPExtractor, Context.RealIP() in v4 trusts the X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP headers from any client, so the rate limiter can be bypassed and the Proxy middleware forwards a spoofed X-Real-IP (GHSA-246p-cpwv-v3jq, GHSA-99jh-6h7p-pp36). Changing this default in v4 would put all clients behind a proxy into one rate-limit bucket, so v4 keeps it. Set an extractor that matches your deployment:

e.IPExtractor = echo.ExtractIPDirect()        // no proxy in front of the app
e.IPExtractor = echo.ExtractIPFromXFFHeader() // behind proxies in private networks that set X-Forwarded-For
// behind a proxy with public addresses (e.g. a CDN), also trust its ranges:
// e.IPExtractor = echo.ExtractIPFromXFFHeader(echo.TrustIPRange(cdnRange))

v5 uses the direct peer address by default since v5.1.0.

Behavior changes to check before upgrading

• Proxies or load balancers with public IP addresses. If a proxy connects to your app from a public (or 100.64.0.0/10) address, its X-Forwarded-Proto is now ignored: HTTPSRedirect redirects in a loop and the Secure middleware stops sending HSTS. This affects, for example, Cloudflare, CloudFront and Azure Front Door connecting to a public origin, the GCP external HTTP(S) load balancer including GKE Ingress (35.191.0.0/16, 130.211.0.0/22), and networks that use 100.64.0.0/10 (such as Alibaba Cloud SLB or EKS custom networking). Trust the proxy's address ranges:

  _, gclb1, _ := net.ParseCIDR("35.191.0.0/16")
  _, gclb2, _ := net.ParseCIDR("130.211.0.0/22")
  e.SchemeExtractor = echo.ExtractSchemeFromHeaders(echo.TrustIPRange(gclb1), echo.TrustIPRange(gclb2))

... (truncated)

Commits

• c99c7cb chore: prepare v4.16.3 security release (#3198)
• ebbb855 fix: secure v4 client IP defaults for proxying and rate limiting (#3197)
• fa780cd docs: state v4 bug-fix and security-fix dates (#3194)
• 679c415 chore: prepare v4.16.2 release (#3191)
• 3b16891 fix(middleware): reject empty CSRF tokens in v4 (#3189)
• 6d1bb2e fix(middleware): check Basic auth scheme boundary in v4 (#3188)
• ea608ae fix(middleware): reject CSRF TokenLookup that produces no extractors in v4 (#...
• See full diff in compare view

Updates github.com/labstack/echo/v4 from 4.16.1 to 4.16.3

Release notes

Sourced from github.com/labstack/echo/v4's releases.

v4.16.3

Security and migration

Applications behind proxies must configure Echo#IPExtractor to trust their own proxies before upgrading. Without an extractor, clients behind one proxy share its address for rate limiting, IP-based access controls, logging, and proxy forwarding. The safe default now ignores client-supplied IP headers.

This release fixes the remaining v4 exposure for:

• CVE-2026-118651: Proxy always derives upstream X-Real-IP from Context.RealIP(), including after hop-by-hop header stripping and on WebSocket upgrades. One derived identity is preserved across retries.
• CVE-2026-118653: Context.RealIP() uses the connection peer when IPExtractor is unset, so rotating spoofed forwarded-IP headers cannot create fresh default rate-limit buckets.

Use echo.ExtractIPDirect() without a proxy. Behind a proxy, use ExtractIPFromXFFHeader or ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader with trust restricted to your proxies. Configure the outermost proxy to replace client-supplied identity headers. Explicit extractors and custom rate-limit identifiers retain their behavior.

Migration example with explicit proxy trust ranges

Other changes

• Resolve bare IPv4 and IPv6 connection addresses without a port.
• Document v4 support dates (#3194).

No dependency or minimum Go-version changes; Go 1.26 or later remains required.

The security fix (#3197) passed independent agent and Claude reviews, full race tests on Go 1.26 and 1.27, and GitHub Linux/macOS/Windows checks.

Full Changelog: labstack/echo@v4.16.2...v4.16.3

v4.16.2

Fixes

• Require a space after the case-insensitive Basic authentication scheme. Malformed schemes such as BasicX no longer invoke the credential validator. Valid credentials are still required. This adapts the v5 correction to v4's single-header API. #3188, backport of #3138, with credit to @​Shubham-Padkonde.
• Reject empty cookie tokens and empty client tokens in CSRF validation. This is defense in depth; it does not introduce a new security advisory. #3189, backport of #3135, with credit to @​hoangtaiki.
• Reject CSRFConfig.TokenLookup configurations that produce no recognized token extractors. Middleware creation now returns an error instead of silently skipping token validation. #3149, thanks to @​orinnz; backport of the existing v5 validation in #3067.

Upgrade

go get github.com/labstack/echo/v4@v4.16.2

Go 1.26 remains the module minimum. Build deployments with a supported, patched Go toolchain. No dependencies or public APIs changed in this release. Applications with invalid CSRF token lookup configuration will now fail middleware creation at startup.

The security fixes, bounded BodyDump and Decompress defaults, and dependency updates released in v4.16.1 are included unchanged. Their first patched version remains v4.16.1.

Validation: the fixes passed regression tests and upstream race-test, lint and benchmark checks on Linux, macOS and Windows with Go 1.26 and 1.27. The new regressions were also verified to fail without the fixes; local race tests and vet passed.

Full changelog: labstack/echo@v4.16.1...v4.16.2

Changelog

Sourced from github.com/labstack/echo/v4's changelog.

v4.16.3 - 2026-10-29

Security

• Client IP defaults: when Echo#IPExtractor is unset, Context.RealIP() now uses the connection peer and ignores X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP. This prevents clients from selecting their own default rate-limit bucket. Fixes CVE-2026-118653.
• Proxy identity: Proxy middleware always replaces upstream X-Real-IP with the derived client identity, including after Connection-nominated header removal and on WebSocket upgrades. The identity is derived once and preserved across retries. Fixes CVE-2026-118651.

Migration required for applications behind proxies

Configure Echo#IPExtractor to trust only your deployment's proxies before upgrading. Otherwise, clients behind one proxy share its address for rate limiting, access controls, logging, and proxy forwarding. See the README migration example for explicit XFF trust ranges; use the same trust options with ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader for proxies that set X-Real-IP. Configure the outermost proxy to replace client-supplied identity headers. Explicit extractors and custom rate-limit identifiers retain their behavior.

Other changes

• The direct-peer fallback now accepts bare IPv4 and IPv6 addresses without a port.
• Document v4 bug-fix and security-fix support dates (#3194).

Implementation: #3197. No dependency or minimum Go-version changes; Go 1.26 or later remains required.

v4.16.0 - 2026-09-27

Security

This release fixes several security issues. Upgrading is recommended. Some fixes change behavior; read "Behavior changes to check before upgrading" below.

• Request scheme: Context.Scheme() now uses the X-Forwarded-Proto, X-Forwarded-Protocol, X-Forwarded-Ssl and X-Url-Scheme headers only when the request comes directly from a loopback, link-local or private network address or a unix socket. Before this, any client could send X-Forwarded-Proto: https over plain HTTP and skip HTTPSRedirect. When X-Forwarded-Proto is present, only it is used (its last value), and the scheme is returned in lowercase. the new Echo#SchemeExtractor field selects the strategy: ExtractSchemeFromHeaders(...TrustOption) (default), ExtractSchemeDirect() or LegacySchemeExtractor(). The Secure middleware now sets HSTS based on Context.Scheme(). The Proxy middleware always sets X-Forwarded-Proto from Context.Scheme() and removes X-Forwarded-Ssl, X-Forwarded-Protocol and X-Url-Scheme before forwarding. GHSA-2ffq-g2xg-c22p
• JSONP: Context.JSONP and Context.JSONPBlob accept only a callback that is empty, a JavaScript identifier or a dot-separated path of identifiers (ASCII letters, digits, _ and $). Any other callback returns a 400 Bad Request error that wraps the new ErrInvalidJSONPCallback, and nothing is written. JSONP responses now carry X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff. JSONP lets any website read the response with the user's cookies, so do not use it for data that needs authentication. GHSA-h9g5-28mm-hx3g
• MethodOverride: a POST can no longer be overridden to GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE or CONNECT. Before this, with the MethodFromForm or MethodFromQuery getter and MethodOverride registered with Use before the CSRF middleware, _method=GET skipped the CSRF check. Register MethodOverride with Echo#Pre. GHSA-r7w9-592q-9vg4
• Redirects: the trailing slash middlewares and the static directory redirect percent-encode control characters in the redirect path. Before this, /%09/evil.example/ redirected browsers to evil.example. GHSA-v753-g4cw-jm48
• Static files: with the default settings, the Static middleware resolves files from the same form of the path that the router matched, so /admin%2Fsecret.txt or /%61dmin/secret.txt can no longer reach a file under a guarded /admin/* route. GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4 The Static middleware and StaticDirectoryHandler (used by Echo.Static, Echo.StaticFS, Group.Static and Group.StaticFS) no longer serve paths with a ., .. or empty segment, such as /assets/../admin/secret.txt, also after path unescaping. GHSA-3pmx-cf9f-34xr
• Dependencies: update golang.org/x/text to v0.40.0 (GO-2026-5970).

Client IP address (no code change in v4)

Without Echo#IPExtractor, Context.RealIP() in v4 trusts the X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP headers from any client, so the rate limiter can be bypassed and the Proxy middleware forwards a spoofed X-Real-IP (GHSA-246p-cpwv-v3jq, GHSA-99jh-6h7p-pp36). Changing this default in v4 would put all clients behind a proxy into one rate-limit bucket, so v4 keeps it. Set an extractor that matches your deployment:

e.IPExtractor = echo.ExtractIPDirect()        // no proxy in front of the app
e.IPExtractor = echo.ExtractIPFromXFFHeader() // behind proxies in private networks that set X-Forwarded-For
// behind a proxy with public addresses (e.g. a CDN), also trust its ranges:
// e.IPExtractor = echo.ExtractIPFromXFFHeader(echo.TrustIPRange(cdnRange))

v5 uses the direct peer address by default since v5.1.0.

Behavior changes to check before upgrading

• Proxies or load balancers with public IP addresses. If a proxy connects to your app from a public (or 100.64.0.0/10) address, its X-Forwarded-Proto is now ignored: HTTPSRedirect redirects in a loop and the Secure middleware stops sending HSTS. This affects, for example, Cloudflare, CloudFront and Azure Front Door connecting to a public origin, the GCP external HTTP(S) load balancer including GKE Ingress (35.191.0.0/16, 130.211.0.0/22), and networks that use 100.64.0.0/10 (such as Alibaba Cloud SLB or EKS custom networking). Trust the proxy's address ranges:

  _, gclb1, _ := net.ParseCIDR("35.191.0.0/16")
  _, gclb2, _ := net.ParseCIDR("130.211.0.0/22")
  e.SchemeExtractor = echo.ExtractSchemeFromHeaders(echo.TrustIPRange(gclb1), echo.TrustIPRange(gclb2))

... (truncated)

Commits

• c99c7cb chore: prepare v4.16.3 security release (#3198)
• ebbb855 fix: secure v4 client IP defaults for proxying and rate limiting (#3197)
• fa780cd docs: state v4 bug-fix and security-fix dates (#3194)
• 679c415 chore: prepare v4.16.2 release (#3191)
• 3b16891 fix(middleware): reject empty CSRF tokens in v4 (#3189)
• 6d1bb2e fix(middleware): check Basic auth scheme boundary in v4 (#3188)
• ea608ae fix(middleware): reject CSRF TokenLookup that produces no extractors in v4 (#...
• See full diff in compare view

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Quality Gate passed

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